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Abandonment of Contaminated
Property Under the Bankruptcy
Code-From Midlantic to In Re Smith
Douglas, What Next?
INTRODUCTION
The abandonment of property' upon which state environ-
mental violations exist has become a controversial issue. "It is
only recently that the public has learned of the magnitude of
the dangers associated with toxic waste disposal; at the same
time, the last few years have witnessed a rising tide of bank-
ruptcies." '2 Prior to Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection,3 abandonment of con-
taminated property was the general rule. 4 In re Smith-Douglas,
Inc.5 is the highest decision to date to interpret the issue ad-
dressed in Midlantic on point. This Comment considers post-
Midlantic attempts to resolve the problems presented by aban-
donment of contaminated property under the Bankruptcy Code.
I. SECTION 554(a)
The overriding purpose of bankruptcy liquidation is the ex-
peditious reduction of the debtor's property to money, for eq-
uitable distribution to creditors .6 Abandonment is "the release
from the debtor's estate of property previously included in that
As authorized under 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Supp. 1990).
Matter of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984). See also,
Cosetti and Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs, and Penn Terra: The Bank-
ruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflicts and Options for the
Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J. L. & CoM. 65 (1987) ("As of August
1985, it was estimated that 74 hazardous waste facilities had filed for bankruptcy. An
EPA study concluded that over the next fifty years, 25-30% of the firms owning land
disposal facilities will petition for bankruptcy.")
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
In re 82 Milbar Blvd. Inc., 91 B.R. 213, 218 n.16 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
6 Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930).
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estate.'' Abandonment permits the trustee to efficiently reduce
the debtor's property to money for distribution to creditors, by
freeing the estate of property that was worthless or not expected
to sell for a price sufficiently in excess of encumbrances to offset
the costs of administration.8 Section 554(a) provides; "After
notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of incon-
sequential value to the estate." In Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,9 the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of abandonment of property
upon which state environmental violations exist, and carved out
a narrow exception to that abandonment power. 10
II. MmwA~mc NATONAL BANK V. NJDEP
Any discussion of a bankruptcy trustee's power to abandon
property upon which state environmental violations exist must
begin with a discussion of Midlantic. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
created an exception to the abandonment power, holding "a
trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state
statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the
public health or safety from identified hazards."" However, the
plain language of § 554(a) does not place any restraints on
abandonment.
2
The identified hazard in Midlantic was waste oil contami-
nated by PCB's, a highly toxic carcinogenic." Quanta Resources
Corporation ("Quanta") was in the business of processing waste
7 2 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 30.01 (1984).
'4 L. Kno, COLlIER ON BANKRuPTcY § 554.01 (5th ed. 1985).
'474 U.S. 494 (1986).
10 "This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by §554 is a
narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of
such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not be fettered
by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety
from imminent and identifiable harm." Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
I d. at 507.
2 See Cosetti and Friedman, supra note 2, at 67.
In Matter of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 913 n.l (3d Cir. 1984) it
was found that, "PCB's are themselves toxic. (Citation omitted). Their oxidation prod-
ucts (produced upon burning PCB's) are also toxic. Among the oxidation products of
PCB's are polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (the so-called "dioxins") and polychlori-
nated dibenzo forans, which are powerful carcinogens, teratogens, and liver toxins."




oil at 2 facilities, one in Long Island City, New York and the
other in Edgewater, New Jersey.' 4 The Edgewater facility was
operating under a temporary operating permit issued by the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP"),
respondent in the case." The petitioner, Midlantic National Bank,
had provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan, secured by inventory,
equipment, and accounts receivable. 16 That same month, NJDEP
discovered Quanta had accepted 400,000 gallons of the PCB
contaminated oil at the Edgewater site in violation of its oper-
ating permit, and ordered Quanta to cease operations. Quanta
and the agency began negotiating the cleanup of the site, but
Quanta filed a reorganization petition under Chapter 1117 of the
Bankruptcy Code before negotiations were complete, and the
next day NJDEP issued an administrative order for Quanta to
clean up the site.'8 The next month Quanta converted to Chapter
7 liquidation, and a trustee was appointed.' 9 A subsequent in-
vestigation of the Long Island site disclosed that Quanta had
stored over 70,000 gallons of the contaminated oil at the site in
deteriorating and leaking containers.30 After trying without suc-
cess to sell the Long Island property, the trustee moved to
abandon the real property pursuant to § 554(a). "No party to
the bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's allegation that
the site was 'burdensome' and of 'inconsequential value to the
estate' within the meaning of § 554.
'21
The city and state of New York objected, contending that
abandonment would threaten the public's health and safety, and
would violate state and federal environmental law. New York
asked the Bankruptcy court to order that the assets of Quanta
be used to clean up the site.2 However, the Bankruptcy court
approved the abandonment, finding the city and state were in a
better position to do what needed to be done.?3 Shortly after-
wards, the trustee moved to abandon the personal property at






Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
21 Id.
12 Id. at 498.
3 Id.
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the Edgewater site, which was approved over NJDEP's objec-
tions that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public
from the hazardous wasteA2
The parties in the New York litigation consented to NJDEP's
taking a direct appeal from Bankruptcy Court to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Code. 25 The appellate
court reversed and remanded, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
A. Pre-Code Protections
The Supreme Court found that prior to the 1978 revisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, a judicially-developed doctrine existed
to protect state or federal interests, and determined that Con-
gress did not intend to pre-empt that doctrine. 26 The court relied
on three cases decided prior to the 1978 revisions to the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 27 the Court of Ap-
peals found that the trustee of a barge company could not
abandon several barges which would have obstructed a navigable
passage in contravention of federal law. The court held that the
abandonment rule must give way when it conflicts with a safety
of navigation statute, which is a duty and burden imposed by
an Act of Congress in the public interest. 28
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.,29 the Court of Appeals
held that a trustee could not cease operations of a branch railway
line in contravention of a local law requiring continued opera-
tion. The court did not forbid abandonment, but required the
trustee's actions to conform with state law.30 Likewise, In re
Lewis Jones, Inc.,' required the debtor to seal off underground
steam lines before abandonment. Relying upon these cases, the
Midlantic Court declared that when Congress codified the rule
of abandonment there were "well recognized restrictions on a
trustee's abandonment power," and so must have meant to
include the "established corollary that a trustee could not exer-
24 Id.
23 Id.
16 Id. at 500-501. See also Cosetti and Friedman, supra note 2, at 76.
198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 290.
129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942).
o Id.
11 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974).
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cise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and
federal laws." '32 Since the abandonment power was clearly re-
stricted through judicial interpretation when Congress enacted §
554(a), if Congress intended for this legislation to alter that
interpretation, it would specifically note any intended changes.3"
B. Bankruptcy Code Protections
The Court found further support for the proposition that
the abandonment power is restricted by looking to other sections
of the Code. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code34 is the
automatic stay provision, which is
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repay-
ment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.35
32 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
I d.; see also, Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
266-277 (1979).
Section 362(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under
section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commence-
ment of the old case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
or of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate; (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate; (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against
property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (6) any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the setoff of any debt
owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the commencement
or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court con-
cerning the debtor.
11 S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 340 (1977).
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Despite this fundamental protection, Congress created several
exceptions to the stay, and the Court cites § 362(b)(5), which
permits the Government to enforce nonmonetary judgments
against a debtor's estate.36 The Court sidesteps the inference that
express exceptions to the automatic stay provision would imply
that an exception was not intended for the abandonment power
provision,3 7 finding instead that Congress had significantly
broadened the scope of § 362, and that it "was necessary for
Congress to limit this new power expressly."
38
The Court also looks for support to Title 28 U.S.C. 959(b),
which requires the trustee to manage and operate the property
in his possession according to the requirements of the State. 9
Even though not applying to abandonment, the Court found the
section "supports our conclusion the Congress did not intend
for the . .. Code to pre-empt all state laws . . 4
C. Other Statutory Protections
The Court finds additional support in "repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its 'goal of protecting the environment against
toxic pollution, ' ' 4 referring to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, ("RCRA") 42 "which monitors hazardous wastes
from their creation until after their permanent disposal, ' 4 and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA")", which establishes a fund for the
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 503.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
38 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504.
39 Section 959(b) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including
a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his
possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the require-
ments of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in
the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to
do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
,0 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505.
4I Id. (citing Chemical Manufacturers Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 143 (1985)).
42 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
41 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505.
" Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682 (1982)
and at 42 U.S.C.A. § 691 1(a), §§ 9601-9657 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990)).
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cleanup of hazardous waste sites. The majority concludes that
"[in the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of
the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic subst-
ances, we are unwilling to presume that by enactment of §
554(a), Congress implicitly overturned longstanding restrictions
on the common law abandonment power." ' 45 Therefore, the
"Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade-
quately protect the public's health and safety." 46
D. Minority Opinion Criticisms
In a scathing dissent by Justice Rehnquist, joined by the
Chief Justice, and Justices White and O'Connor, the minority
attacked the majority's reliance on "well recognized restrictions
of a trustee's abandonment power" 47 prior to codification. Justice
Rehnquist convincingly argues that the three cases cited by the
majority do not stand for the proposition asserted by the ma-
jority. The minority opinion distinguishes Ottenheimer because
that case required reconciliation of a conflict with a federal
statute and a judicial gloss on the Bankruptcy Act 4 9 while in
Midlantic the "conflict is with the uncertain commands of state
laws the Court declines to identify.'"'1 Also, the pre-code law of
abandonment was judge-made, and "raises ... the inquiry as
to whether that court would have decided the case the same way
under the present Code." 5'
The minority concedes that In re Lewis Jones, Inc.12 comes
closer to supporting the majority's position, but "it too turns
on the judge-made nature of the abandonment power," and that
"the isolated decision of a single Bankruptcy Court [does not]
rises to the level of 'established law' that we can fairly assume
Congress intended to incorporate." 53
" Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506.
,6 Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47 Id.
" Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952). See supra text accom-
panying notes 27-28.
,9 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).Id.
-o Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974). See supra text accompanying
note 31.
'3 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 511 (citation omitted) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1990-91]
JouRNAi OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
The minority points out that in In re Chicago Rapid Tran-
sit, 4 the lower court authorized abandonment, with the impo-
sition of conditions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
authorization of the abandonment, and the bankrupt did not
appeal the propriety of the conditions. "So while ... dicta
[may] ... support some limitation on the power of abandon-
ment, the holding of the case certainly does not.""
The minority also cites Code §§ 362(b)(4) and (5) for the
proposition that "Congress knew how to draft an exception
covering the exercise of 'certain' police powers when it wanted
to."51 6 The dissent also cites § 1170(a)(2), pointing out that
Congress "also knew how to draft a qualified abandonment
provision."57
Rehnquist found the majority's discussion of § 959(b)
"somewhat difficult to fathom. ' S8 The majority conceded that
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to abandonment, but does not
delineate its indirect application. Rehnquist argues that aban-
donment does not fall within the parameters of "management
or operation" of the estate under the § 959(b) provision.5 9 He
cites In Re Adelphi Hospital Corp.6° for the language "in pre-
Code liquidation proceedings the trustee is in no sense a manager
of an institutions's operations."
6'
In Rehnquist's view, the Bankruptcy Court is a court of
equity, but cannot enforce its views regarding sound public
policy contrary to the Code's purpose, and forcing clean up of
the sites using the assets of the estate is "plainly . . . contrary
to the purposes of the Code." 62 While abandonment may aggra-
vate existing dangers, notification of authorities before aban-
donment will adequately protect the public, and
notice before abandonment in appropriate cases is perfectly
consistent with the Code. It advances the State's interest in
protecting the public health and safety, and, unlike the rather
uncertain exception to the abandonment power propounded by
129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942). See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 513.
17 Id. at 513.
58 Id.
19 Id. at 514.
- 579 F.2d 726, 729, n.6 (2nd Cir. 1978).




the court, at the same time allows for the orderly liquidation
and distribution of the estate's assets."
'63
Rehnquist concedes that there may be a far narrower condition,
where abandonment "might create a genuine emergency that the
trustee would be uniquely able to guard against." In those
circumstances, "the narrow exception that I would reserve surely
would embrace that situation.
65
III. A CRrricAL LOOK AT MDLAN7IC
This portion of the comment will address some of the con-
cerns raised by the majority opinion's handling of Midlantic.
In Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial
Legislation," the authors share Justice Rehnquist's indignation
regarding the majority's reasoning, and state that "[s]uch a
limitation is clearly contrary to the legislative intent on the right
to abandon. ' 67 The article in general attacks cases such as Mid-
lantic as judicial legislation." Midlantic infers from Congres-
sional silence that the "well recognized restriction" on
abandonment must clearly be included in the codification of §
554(a), since Congress did not make an explicit statement of its
intent to change this judicial interpretation. 69 The legislative
history of § 554(a) is sparse, consisting of this statement: "This
section authorizes the court to authorize the trustee to abandon
any property that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value to the estate. Abandonment may be to any
party with a possessory interest in the property abandoned." 70
61 Id. at 515.
-Id.
6, Id.
Klee and Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legis-
lation, 62 AM. BAxR. L.J. 1 (1988).
61 Id. at 8.
Id. at 2, n.42:
The 'mixed' signal the Supreme Court sends lower courts is clear though
unarticulated-use rules of construction to support, rather than to deter-
mine a result. Adopt a 'plain meaning' posture where the language of the
statute meets with judicial approval, and use legislative intent to contradict
the language of the statute where a literal reading is not kind to the desired
result. Leaving the courts with such flexibility allows the judiciary to
construct a congressional intent that comports with any judge's view on
an issue.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
70 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978).
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While Justice Rehnquist did not stress the issue, other sec-
tions of the Code include restrictions, and the absence of any
such restriction in § 554 should give rise to the inference that
restrictions were intentionally excluded. "[W]here Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."
7'
The authors rely on Justice Rehnquist's dissent, the clear
language of § 554(a) and its negative inferences, and the absence
of legislative history, in concluding, "Congress never envisioned
any restriction to the § 554 powers. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion does little more than legislate a priority imposing the cost
of clean-up on the creditors of a bankrupt company rather than
on the entire populace of a particular state.' '72
Another article agreed with the conclusion reached by the
Midlantic Court, but was dissatisfied with its analysis.73 Pointing
to the three pre-Code cases cited for the judicially created ex-
ception to the abandonment power, the author reasoned that
the Court should have furthered its analysis by pointing out that
the purpose of these holdings were to prevent future harm. If
the court had recognized these considerations, the author rea-
sons, they could have established a specific common law limi-
tation: prevention of future harm to people or the environment. 74
However, the holding of the Midlantic decision may be more
valid and reasonable than at first thought. The risk to public
health and safety immediately comes to mind. When considered
in light of the facts of Midlantic, the Court's holding is quite
reasonable. The Midlantic trustee was not required to take any
steps to reduce danger to the public, and actually aggravated the
danger by allowing the removal of a 24 hour security patrol and
the shutting down of a fire suppression system."
' United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972), quoted with
approval in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
11 Klee and Merola, supra, note 66, at 10 n.35.
73 Note, Creditor's Right when Federal Bankruptcy Laws Conflict with State
Environmental Agency Enforcement Powers after Midlantic National Bank, 48 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 879 (1987).
7 Id. at 888.
71 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499, n.3: "The trustee was not required to take even
relatively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and
diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover,
[VOL. 6:291
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While the statutory construction given § 554(a) in Midlantic
is strained, it can be viewed as logical and conforming with the
rule that statutes on the same subject are construed together.76
"Provisions in one act which are omitted in another on the same




The decisions following Midlantic have covered a wide spec-
trum, from allowing abandonment only if the estate has fully
complied with all environmental laws and regulations, to allow-
ing abandonment in all cases unless there is an immediate,
imminent, and identifiable risk of harm to the public health and
safety.
In re Peerless Plating8 interpreted the Midlantic decision as
requiring full compliance with applicable law. While the bank-
rupt in Peerless was found to be in violation of CERCLA instead
of state law, the bankruptcy court found that this was not a
significant distinction. 79 The court further found that the lan-
guage in Midlantic called for a three part test:
The clear impact of the Midlantic language ... would appear
to be that a trustee may not abandon a hazardous waste site
unless:
1. the environmental law in question is so onerous as to inter-
fere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself; or
2. the environmental law in question is not reasonably de-
signed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards; or
3. the violation caused by abandonment would merely be spec-
ulative or indeterminate. s°
the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing dangers by halting
security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire." Joint Appendix in
No. 83-5142 (CA3). pp. 11-12 (affidavit of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for
N.Y. City Fire Department); id. at 26 (transcript of proceedings before Devito, J.)
(emphasis added). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in
unguarded, deteriorating containers, "present[ed] risks of explosion, fire, contamination
of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23.
,6 Sutherland Stat. Const. § 51.02 (4th ed. 1984).
" Id.; see generally, State "Superlien" Statutes: An Attempt to Resolve the Con-
flict Between the Bankruptcy Code and Environmental Law, 59 TEMPLE L. Q. 981, 1003-
1005 (1986).
11 70 B.R. 943 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. 1987).
79 Id. at 948 n.4.
80 Id. at 947.
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As to the first part of the test, the court noted that Midlantic
did not provide an example of such an "onerous" law, but
found that depletion of the estate's assets is not a valid argument
for allowing abandonment.8' The court speculated that such an
onerous law could be one that prohibited abandonment even
after the estate was exhausted.8 2
Although the evidence presented at trial in an attempt to
prove the threat of immediate harm was "slapdash", the court
nevertheless found that there was an immediate harm of the sort
Congress meant to prevent by enacting CERCLA. 3 The court
further found that since the presence of hazardous conditions
was ongoing, it was not merely "a speculative or indeterminate
violation." 84 Perhaps the notable distinction in Peerless is the
court's declaration that the trustee must expend the unencum-
bered assets of the estate in cleaning up the property. 5
The other end of the spectrum is represented by In re Frank-
lin Signal Corporation." The bankruptcy court essentially held
that a trustee is required to take minimal steps to protect the
public from imminent danger as a result of abandonment.8 7 The
court would apply a case-by-case approach to analyzing whether
abandonment of hazardous wastes should be authorized.8 It
would require two affirmative steps by the trustee prior to aban-
donment: first, to conduct an investigation to determine what
hazardous substances burden the property, 9 and second, to in-
form the appropriate agencies of the situation, including the
intent to abandon. 90
"1 Id.
91 Id. at 947 n.3.
11 Id. at 947.
- Peerless, 70 B.R. at 947.
I1 d. at 948 (emphasis added).
65 B.R. 268 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 1986).
Id. at 272.
U Id. at 272: "At least five factors must be considered: (1) the imminence of
danger to the public health and safety, (2) the extent of probable harm, (3) the amount
and type of hazardous waste, (4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with
environmental laws, and (5) the amount and type of funds available for cleanup."
" Id. at 273 n.8:
This condition does not require a trustee to investigate all property subject
to abandonment. It is only when the trustee reasonably believes that an
abandonment would violate state environmental laws that a preliminary
investigation is required. Furthermore, the trustee does not necessarily have
to -employ an independent investigator to determine if the property is
contaminated. Any reasonable means of investigation is permissible.
90 Id. at 273.
[VOL. 6:291
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In In re Purco9l, the trustee moved to abandon inventory
located on the real property of the debtor. While there was no
qualified testimony that the inventory was hazardous waste, the
bankruptcy court assumed for the purposes of its opinion that
it was, yet found "there is no showing that the public health
and safety are not adequately protected .. ." and so allowed
abandonment. 92
In In re Oklahoma Refining Co.,91 the violations were the
result of 65 years of crude oil refining at the site. Large quan-
tities of spent acid and caustic materials, as well as other waste
substances, were dumped into open pits near a stream. The
primary public health and safety concern is the leaching of
"noxious" substances into the underground aquifer, and into
the stream, which is a tributary of other streams that provide
water for public consumption. 94 No contamination of the water
supplies have yet been detected. 9s All of the expert witnesses
testified that harm to the public is not now imminent; however,
a toxicologist testified that something "bad" will eventually
happen. 96 The court distinguished Midlantic factually, by rea-
soning that, there, abandonment would have aggravated existing
dangers, while in the instant case, "denying and allowing aban-
donment produces the same result." The court allowed aban-
donment, saying "[t]o require strict compliance with State
environmental law under the facts of this case could create a
bankruptcy case in perpetuity and fetter the estate to a situation
without resolve.' '98
V. IN Rm SMITH-DOUGLAS
The property involved in In re Smith-Douglas" was a fertil-
izer plant located at Streator, Illinois, part of the estate of Smith-
Douglas, Inc. Upon it were conditions that violated Illinois'
76 B.R. 523 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Pa. 1987).
Id. at 533.
'7 63 B.R. 562 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Oki. 1986).
I d. at 563.
"Id.
Id. at 563-64.
'7 Id. at 565. "Under either scenario there were no funds available to finance the
closure plan or post closure monitoring."
" Id. at 565.
9- 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
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environmental laws.'" The Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency ("IEPA") monitored the facility, but had never taken
any enforcement action. Smith-Douglas at first attempted a re-
organization, but subsequently determined that it would be un-
successful, and converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.
A trustee was appointed, and began liquidating the estate. There
were no unencumbered assets. Eventually all of the property was
sold, except the plant. The trustee moved to abandon, with
Borden, Garrett' 0 ' and the State of Illinois opposing abandon-
ment. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the environmental
violations did not present any imminent danger to the public.
The District Court affirmed the findings of the Bankruptcy
'0 Id. at 14. The violations were as follows:
A. Ponds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were considered as treatment works, but they
were operated without operating permits.
B. Pond 2 was subject to flooding during wet weather periods. It was
not constructed, nor was it being operated, to minimize violations during
wet weather periods.
C. Contaminants were deposited upon the land so as to create a water
pollution hazard. Contaminants also had entered waters of the state at a
number of locations at the facility and had caused violations of the Stream
Water Quality Standards.
D. The discharge from sewer 4 and the discharge ditch out of pond 4
were considered point source discharges which require National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permits. The facility had no such permits.
E. Waters in the abandoned creek bed violated the water quality standards
as follows: (1) The waters contained unnatural sludge, bottom deposits,
color and turbidity. (2) Two water samples demonstrated a low pH (less
than 6.5) and contamination by excessive amounts of fluoride, sulfate,
cadmium, iron, and manganese.
F. Contaminants were entering Phillips Creek, causing the creek to con-
taln unnatural sludge, bottom deposits, color and turbidity.
G. Waters contained in the roadside ditch adjacent to Smith-Douglas
Road violated water quality standards as follows: (1) The waters contained
unnatural sludge, bottom deposits, color, turbidity and odor. (2) A water
sample showed a low pH (less than 6.5) and contamination by excessive
amounts of fluoride, sulfate, iron, and manganese.
H. A sediment sample at pond 2 indicated an arsenic concentration that
is higher than authorized but not at the danger level.
I. A liquid sample in a sump at the base of two tanks had a pH of less
than one which is considered "hazardous" under regulations.
J. There were several 55 gallon drums of liquid waste with a flash point
below 140.
K. One 55 gallon drum contained hazardous waste.
L. There were over ten drums of spent vanadium pentoxide waste which
is a hazardous waste.
M. Three tanks contained spent sulfuric acid.
In re Smith-Douglas, 856 F.2d at 14.
,01 Borden Inc., and Bernard Garrett were former owners of the Streator facility.
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Court, but found the financial condition of the debtor irrelevant.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court, save for the financial condition of the debtor being
irrelevant. The appellate court began its discussion with the
problem of enforcing both a federal statute and a conflicting
state statute, holding that state laws which require a bankruptcy
trustee to maintain burdensome property may be pre-empted by
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution. °' The Smith-Douglas court held that Midlantic created
"a narrow exception to the trustee's abandonment power in
order to protect the public safety rather than a broad exception
to shield the state treasury." 0 3 While recognizing this exception
is contrary to the purposes of abandonment, "where conditions
on property pose a danger of imminent death or illness, the
person in control should not be permitted to abandon it with
such conditions unattended."1 4 The Smith-Douglas court qual-
ified this holding by requiring that there be a serious health risk,
where public health and safety is threatened with imminent and
indentifiable harm, not where hazards are "speculative or may
await appropriate action by an environmental agency."' 05
It seems apparent from this language that compliance with
state environmental regulations will be unnecessary, and the
abandonment prohibition applies only when the public is im-
mediately threatened. However, the court opined that when an
estate has unencumbered assets, stricter compliance with state
environmental laws should be required. Cleanup costs are an
"administrative expense within the meaning of § 507(a)(1), and
would have priority over unsecured claims but be subordinate
to secured claims."'06
When presented with the question of whether to authorize
abandonment of property upon which state environmental viol-
ations exist, the Smith-Douglas court held that the bankruptcy
court must make the initial determination as to whether "the
:02 Smith-Douglas, 856 F.2d at 16. "[W]hen enforcement of a state law or regulation
would undermine or stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress in enacting a federal statute, the conflict must be resolved
in favor of the federal law." Id. at 15 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67
(1941)).
103 Smith-Douglas, 856 F.2d. at 16.
104 Id.
105 Id.
306 Id. at 17.
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risk of imminent harm exists in reference to the design of state
law." °P If such a risk exists, there must be "conditions that will
adequately protect the public health and safety in accordance
with governing state law." 3 Since the IEPA had not taken any
enforcement action, 109 it was not clearly erroneous to determine
that there was no threat of immediate. harm.
CONCLUSION
The Smith-Douglas decision correctly tracks the language and
spirit of Midlantic, and applies a well reasoned analysis of the
facts of the case to the prohibition against abandonment. Within
the bounds of existing law, the Smith-Douglas decision is a
sound approach. However, Smith-Douglas takes a disturbing
step towards the establishment of a presumption that the inac-
tivity of a state agency implies there is no public health or safety
threat. This may prove to be a significant contribution to a
dangerous trend. Inactivity of a state agency regarding existing
environmental law violations should merely be one of several
factors when applying the imminent threat to public safety anal-
ysis. .
It remains to be seen-whether Smith-Douglas will resolve the
conflict among the Bankruptcy Courts regarding abandonment
of property upon which state environmental violations exist. The
only certainty is that abandonment will not be permitted if there
is an imminent, immediate danger to the public health and
safety. One possible corollary is that a presumption that there
is no immediate threat of harm will develop if the state agency
has not taken action against the violator. Until Congress acts,"10
"07 Id. at 16: "The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to substitute its
judgment for that of the state as to what constitutes a serious public health or safety
risk."
100 Id.
11 Id.; See also, In re-Purco, Inc. 76 B.R 523, 533 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Pa. 1987)(inactivity
of agency indicates lack of threat to public health or safety); But see, In re FCX, Inc.
96 B.R. 49 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.C. 1989) (While that may be some evidence that the govern-
ments did not consider this site to pose an immediate danger, it certainly does not decide
the matter.).
1o Sward, E., Resolving Conflicts between Bankruptcy Law and The State Police
Power, 1987 Wi. L. R. 403, 449 (1987):
[E]nvironmental pollution respects no borders, which suggests that the
solution should be at the national level rather than at the state level. Since
the national scope of environmental pollution prompted Congress to act
on it in the first place, perhaps Congress should protect the legislation it
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or until the Supreme Court again addresses the issue, there is
little certainty as to how a motion to abandon contaminated
property under § 554(a) will fare.
Brian Cumbo
has set up from being undermined by bankruptcy law... there are other
areas of state regulation that have received much less attention but that
also need some accommodation in bankruptcy....
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